The fate of “negative freedom” in the political philosophy of T. Hobbes and J.-J. Rousseau

Abstract

Consistently reconstructing the philosophy of freedom of T. Hobbes and J.-J. Rousseau, the author relies, first of all, on the opinion of Y. Habermas, who justifiably believes that without Hobbes and Rousseau, the integral image of the European philosophical discourse of prudent freedom will not be completed. Secondly is the important fact that the images of freedom and justice, initiated in the political philosophy of Hobbes and Rousseau, found their continuation in the work of such famous philosophers as Y. Habermas, A. Honneth, O. Höffe, Ch. Taylor . Thirdly, revealing the essence of Hobbes's interpretation of “negative freedom”, the author seeks to avoid its simplified, “caricatured” (if to use Ch. Taylor's expression) vision and to emphasize the relevance of this concept and its characteristic “grim portrait of human nature” for our tragic present. The significance of Hobbes's ideas about man and his freedom for Rousseau's philosophy is proved, and the thesis is developed that it was Hobbes who sought to comprehensively understand the relationship between the state and citizen, sovereign and subject, rooted in the dependence of freedom on security, and to supplement his vision of “negative freedom” with an understanding of it and as freedom of conscience, as “human and citizen rights” to be recognized by the state. In addition, the idea (further developed in Rousseau's writings) of the relationship between the interpretation of freedom and human nature was born in Hobbes's thoughts. The essence of the concept of consent, which is important for Rousseau, thanks to which we voluntarily become a part of the community, is also revealed: the “complete and solitary” individual, giving up his sovereignty in favor of the whole, becomes a part of it, remaining free. The article concludes that the debate about the fate of “negative freedom” started by Hobbes and Rousseau has not yet found its final solution, despite the attempts of such classics of modern philosophy as Ch. Taylor. His desire to demonstrate the errors, “disadvantages” of “negative freedom” theorized by T. Hobbes did not turn him into a supporter of “positive” freedom due to the hidden danger of totalitarian violence. And Taylor's reflections on the gradation of obstacles on the way to freedom do not acquire the depth of Hobbes's ideas, due to the tragic social contexts of his life.