Empathy and mental reality: problems of ontological and epistemological interpretation

Abstract

This article argues that determining the ontological status of Empathy is today an important part of the problem, which relates to answers to questions about the nature of mental world. Within the framework of the classical division of the world into Mind and Body problem (psychophysical dualism), such objects as empathy had a well-defined explanation. They were interpreted as part of the Incorporeal, Spiritual reality. However, the change of scientific and worldview paradigms laid the conditions for forming a new understanding of such objects' ontological and epistemological status. The traditional philosophical doubling of the world into Mind and Body had its explanation of the status of objects (such as empathy). However, understanding of the Mental world transformed in the middle of the last century. The key questions posed in the article are: do acts of empathy belong to mental reality? Are mental acts part of the mental world? Issues directly related to the concept and phenomenon of Empathy began to attract the attention of researchers from the 40s of the last century. Since the time of the so-called Cognitive turn (Cognitive revolution) within the framework of traditional Analytical philosophy, a separate discipline called Philosophy of Mind has emerged. In this regard, traditional questions of epistemology are formulated and investigated in a new context: а) The problem of Other Mind. An attempt to overcome the idea of ​​the Argument from analogy; .b) The problem of reliability of social knowledge. Discussions around the cognitive function of empathy. Precisely, this article will not be able to provide a final definition of the ontological status of Empathy. Still, an attempt was made to undermine the claim that acts of empathy are a kind of mental acts (in the traditional sense). The source base of the research consists mainly of the works of Wilfred Sellars and Gilbert Ryle.