Reconstruction of the Stagirite argument against the fatalism of future events


free will, fatalism, Aristotle, Stagirite, Interpretation, Formal logic, Informal logic, bivalence

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Myronenko, R. (2020). Reconstruction of the Stagirite argument against the fatalism of future events. Multiversum. Philosophical Almanac, 2(2), 32-42.


The question of free will and determinism is one of the most discussed in analytic philosophy. This is because interdisciplinary research has entered the field of studying the brain and consciousness – and often, consciousness is presented as an invention, an epiphenomenon. One of the attributes of consciousness is free will. The prehistory of modern research in the field of free will is the discussion about the need for future events, which was first analyzed by Stagirite in chapter 9, "On Interpretation". Despite all the analyticity and consistency of Aristotle's works, this work is full of gaps in argumentation and formulations ambiguity. In this regard, over two thousand years, philosophers have described many reconstructions in this chapter's argumentation and interpretations. Conventionally, the question of fatalism can be divided into two intersecting directions: logical fatalism and theological fatalism. This article examines the first direction and will relate to the understanding of fatalism and arguments against it in the context of the development of logic and theory of argumentation in the 20th century. The first logician who radically revised the foundations of logic to build an argument against future events' fatalism was Jan Lukasiewicz. We can say that all his life Lukasiewicz fought against determinism and tried to find a logical basis for human freedom of will. However, the main discussion on this issue took place in the middle of the 20th century between the logicians whose work will be considered in this article: Linsky Leonard, Butler Ronald, Storrs McCall, and others. The discussion was conducted around understanding such philosophical concepts and their ontological status: time, truth, a necessity. Also, in the wake of Lukasiewicz, they clarified such logical concepts as bivalence and the law of the excluded third. Of particular interest was the emergence of logical modalities, true/false, which can change their meaning over time, which led to the emergence of new informal logic.


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