The article is devoted to the analysis of philosophical aspects of determining the methodology of historical study of the sphere of education. The concept of scientific fact, historical fact, methodological conditions for determining scientific facts, peculiarities of determining historical facts are analyzed. The fundamental importance of defining the conception of the study, in particular, the historical conception for establishing the facts, is revealed. The wrong tendency to carry out the scientific research arises when the researcher for the sake of certain value queries begins to distort, limit or even eliminate the requirements for scientific validity of the research and its results. The importance of philosophy as an arbiter and moderator in cases of conflict between concepts has been determined, and accordingly - justification of facts directly opposite to the conclusions of some scientific researches. The role of philosophy in developing a counterfactual position in cognition in general and in the field of education in particular is revealed. The philosophy of education contributes to the success of the educational history research program, but it is critically dependent on the latest in the evaluation of historical events. The specific task of the philosophy of education, which remains not only inaccessible but also forbidden for the history of education, is to establish counterfactual concepts of creating a new type of education: something that did not yet exist is beyond the purview of history. Counteractivity as an orientation to affirm new values that are not yet shared in society and verified only at the level of our aspirations, and not the actual state of affairs, can formally also be regarded as a certain tendency. But the difference lies in two decisive circumstances: first, the counterfactual is asserted not in the interests of any available stakeholder and its available, well-known values, and second, the counterfactuality is asserted in the future interests and for the sake of the future values of all involved. The counterfactuality is not fundamentally party and ideological; rather, it should be called a "good utopia", a utopia in the sense of Karl Mannheim. This means that if counter-factualism does not have its actual area of confirmation now, it is always firmly set up to create it - as opposed to a tendency that is never interested in facts as such, but seeks to put facts into service - not even values, but entirely substantive benefits of selfish groups with party interests and particular values in a worse sense of particularity.
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