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PRAGMATIC AND VALUABLE UNDERSTANDING OF THE PHENOMENON OF FREEDOM IN TIMES OF CRISIS

The purpose of the article is to show that when analyzing evolutionary changes in society, a pragmatist approach to the problem of freedom as a whole does not contradict a value approach, since an important value is the maintenance of vital activity and the free development of man and society. However, in a situation of radical transformation of global society, climatic threats and military-political confrontations between freedom and democracy, on the one hand, and totalitarianism and authoritarianism, on the other, higher transcendental values, which also have a pragmatic goal of survival of human civilization, come first. Pragmatism in the theoretical plane considers its repeatability and verifiability as an important criterion for the recognition of truth (R. Ferber) [5, 113], and in the practical plane – the possibility of realizing a person's ideas in practice. With this in mind, when considering the opposition between pragmatist and value approaches in the analysis of the problem of freedom, several approaches are possible. First, to recognize that narrow pragmatism is guided by selfish values in the process of allocating the resource of freedom, and thereby destroys productive social interaction is ultimately "useless." Secondly, to recognize that certain, even transcendental, values, the most important of which is freedom, are practically useful and such that do not contradict the idea of pragmatism. Therefore, they can be included in the pragmatist categorical system itself as a guide to
action. At the same time, higher transcendental values are inexhaustible, and the aspiration to fully realize them can only be satisfied in the future. A pragmatic approach to the understanding of human freedom is an important tool for its adaptation to nature and society; however, a person adapts better to the natural and social environment in free competitive creativity and solidary co-creation with other individuals. A creative value approach to freedom means the free self-realization of a person on the basis of universal values at the expense of less and less use of non-renewable natural resources and greater use of intellectual and spiritual resources. The conceptual base and practical ability of the pragmatist approach is developed by expanding it at the expense of transcendental values, including the values of freedom. In times of crises and civilizational transformations, society can avoid wars, severe social upheavals, and restrictions on freedom if, listening to the humanitarian elite, it sufficiently understands the deep laws of human and social development, and applies them in its own life practice. It should also be added that the pragmatist criterion of truth demonstrates the degree of realization of practical ideas. As a result of the aggravation of crisis phenomena in the modern world, including large-scale military confrontations, as well as the growing threat of climate catastrophe, the focus of philosophical research is the problem of the correlation of pragmatist and value approaches to the problem of freedom. The pragmatist approach here can be expressed as a problem of human distribution of the resource of freedom in time (A. Schmidt), as a problem of quantitative freedom (C. Dierksmeyer), or one or another way of maintaining the distribution of the resource of freedom among citizens by the state (D. Frederick). The contradiction between pragmatist and value approaches is overcome by including in the pragmatist categorical apparatus evaluation procedures and practical schemes of human activity on the basis of higher transcendental values. At the same time, the pragmatic criterion of truth allows to overcome populism. If the realization of these values in the life of a person and society does not take place with the participation of the humanitarian elite of society through enlightenment and the introduction of progressive social practices, then mankind will acquire relevant knowledge in the conditions of destructive wars and environmental disasters.

**Keywords**: freedom, resources of freedom, values, pragmatism, renewable energy, climate catastrophe, war.

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Introduction

K. Dirksmeyer in his work devoted to the analysis of quantitative and qualitative aspects of freedom notes: “… the crises of the global commons (the over-fishing of the seas, the warming of the climate, the consumption of fossil fuels, etc.) are transforming yesterday’s national foreign policy into today’s global domestic politics … History has made us all cosmopolitans” [3, 5]. This state of affairs requires that a person realizes his potential for freedom, focusing not only on the pragmatic desire for self-realization, but on the transcendental values of saving humanity from environmental and military-political catastrophes. Therefore, the task of modern philosophical research should be the search for how a person should find a balance between the freedom of his own self-realization and the freedom of self-realization of other inhabitants of the planet, including future generations of people.

Purpose. The purpose of the article is to show that when analyzing evolutionary changes in society, a pragmatist approach to the problem of freedom as a whole does not contradict a value approach, since an important value is the maintenance of vital activity and the free development of man and society. However, in a situation of radical transformation of global society, climatic threats and military-political confrontations between freedom and democracy, on the one hand, and totalitarianism and authoritarianism, on the other, higher transcendental values, which also have a pragmatic goal of survival of human civilization, come first.

Statement of basic materials.

The global community entered a severe military-political crisis caused by the polarization of approaches to solving economic and environmental issues. First of all, humanity is threatened by a climate catastrophe, which can be overcome by the rapid introduction of renewable energy in conditions of free competition of production entities that offer more and more energy-efficient equipment and economically profitable renewable energy installations (solar, wind, etc.). In addition, some dictatorial totalitarian regimes, the budget of which depends
significantly on the extraction of hydrocarbons (the Russian Federation, Iran) start wars in order to seize the best geopolitical positions as soon as possible. This is due to the fact that the introduction of renewable energy, saving the global community, is perceived by them as threatening their economic and political position. In this confrontation between totalitarianism and democracy, the understanding of the problem of freedom becomes important: to consider freedom in a narrow pragmatic aspect as a means of personal enrichment, or in a value aspect as the freedom of democratic consolidation of the world community in order to solve urgent global problems of humanity.

In the modern post-industrial information world, in which personal and communicative factors are gaining great importance, an exclusively metaphysical interpretation of freedom is not enough. It must be considered in the context of the multifaceted forms of human-society relations. This is due to the expanded multifaceted understanding of the phenomenon of human freedom in the conditions of modern civilizational transformation.

In the conditions of the current global political and economic crisis, which became extremely acute on February 24, 2022, the issue of understanding freedom has become relevant. Is the pragmatist interpretation of freedom as the freedom of economic entrepreneurship, which should ensure human consumer welfare, sufficient for the full development of humanity? In addition, should a person fight for political freedom as a fundamental transcendental value, which will require great willpower and will inevitably be associated with existential risks? Is the educational activity of the humanitarian elite enough for the majority of society members to assimilate universal global values, or does this require significant socio-political upheavals that even lead to dangerous military actions? How to carry out deep reforms in society, which, according to J. Diamond, reduce the severity of political and economic crises [2]? All these questions are directly related to a deep understanding of the problem of freedom.

A very revealing aspect of the problem of freedom is the ability of a person to regulate his own freedom in time in a certain way. After all, even ancient philosophers thought about the fact that a person can in
a certain way limit the freedom to get pleasure in the present time in order to get even more pleasure in the future. The same applies to freedom as such in its postmodern interpretation - a person can limit the freedom of choice of his own self-realization in the current period of time in order to increase the resource of his own personal freedom and increase the possibilities of freedom of choice in the future.

An important problem for society is the fair distribution of opportunities for the realization of human freedom in society. In order to find out the possibility of realizing freedom in time and its distribution in time, it is necessary to establish a time reference point and a certain time scale in the social lifetime of a person. In society, there may be a certain set of opportunities for the realization of freedom by a person, however, at one or another moment in time, a person can make one of the possible choices from the entire range of possibilities. A. Schmidt calls this point on the time scale the Point of Freedom \[9, 1418\], or the bifurcation point of freedom of choice.

According to A. Schmidt, a person can fall into a kind of voluntary slavery when he commits such actions, as a result of which he goes to prison, or when he starts using drugs, smoking or eating fried food. Having chosen the freedom to perform such actions, a person significantly limits his future freedom. In this case, the question of the legality of the state's paternalism in relation to the way of realizing freedom by a person rightly arises \[9, 1415\]. A person can voluntarily choose a profession that is harmful to his health in order to obtain certain social preferences in the future, but this can reduce his life expectancy and the corresponding opportunities to realize his freedom in the lost future. If a person goes, for example, to North Korea for one purpose or another, it will greatly limit his freedom \[9, 1419\].

A person can, according to A. Schmidt, distribute the realization of his own freedom in time. The assessment of the degree of freedom in the future depending on a person's choices in the past must be carried out according to a certain scheme, namely: "We can determine a person’s intrapersonal distribution \[ex post\] by determining how much freedom she had over some period in the past. But we can also try to estimate how much freedom she will have distributed over a future period."
Using probabilities over what choices a person might make in the future, we can estimate a person’s intrapersonal distribution of freedom \textit{ex ante.}" \cite[1419]{9}. Therefore, a person's freedom of choice is realized not only as a choice of one or another method of action in short-term segments of the life path, but also as a choice of more distant perspectives of a person's life in the natural and social world.

When considering the problem of freedom, it is important to analyze it in connection with the concept of values, which should cover not only the aggregation of a person's self-realization opportunities, but also his creative self-improvement and the development of social skills of interaction with others. As F. Schmidt points out: “…we can hold that personal freedom is necessary to facilitate valuable, respectful forms of social interaction and cooperation. . . Freedom is also about safeguarding an adequate range of choice to allow for personality change (whereby I mean to include both smaller changes in tastes and preferences as well as more significant changes in character)” \cite[1423]{9}. In the end, a person's value orientations can change in the direction of deepening and complication during certain significant temporal aspects of the life path, taking into account that modern society is also developing rapidly. In the issue of the social distribution of opportunities to realize freedom for different people, A. Schmidt starts from the concept of starting opportunities (Starting Gate View), and not the concept of basic income. However, he suggests that starting opportunities should not be counted from the birth of a person, but from the time when he can make an independent choice that will affect the course of his life path. A. Schmidt in this regard cites a hypothetical story of Jack and James, who had the same starting opportunities when they studied at school. When Jack turns ten years old, he begins to disappear from school for many days, and therefore loses his degree, while James studies hard and enters the university. At the age of 26, John is wealthy and has many opportunities for free self-realization, while James' lack of a degree forces him to lead a simple life with little income and a shorter life expectancy \cite[1424]{9}. By making the right choice at certain bifurcation points in one's own life path, a person can accumulate the potential for freedom, since in today's rapidly changing world, a person can have new "starts" and, ac-
accordingly, new starting opportunities, thanks to which it is possible to expand the spectrum of freedom of choice and accumulate greater resource of freedom. The desire to concentrate the resource of freedom on the later period of a person's life at the expense of restrictions here and now is questionable, since a person changes little in old age [9, 1428]. At the same time, thoughtless consumer spending of the resource of freedom here and now without projecting one's own activity for several years in advance can lead to a narrowing of the sphere of human freedom in the future [9, 1429]. An important factor that increases the level of human freedom, according to A. Schmidt, is paternalism, which protects a person from voluntary slavery, for example, drug addiction. Temporarily restricting the freedom of the specified person during a certain critical period of time for him increases the level of freedom during his next life [9, 1435].

No less important, according to A. Schmidt, is the discussion about the fair distribution of the resource of freedom among members of society. However, the paternalistic concern of public opinion regarding the fact that a person does not fall into voluntary slavery and does not lose his own resource of freedom is a rather debatable issue, as it interferes with the dignity of a person. Therefore, it is not necessary to directly apply the ideas of normative political theory to solving the problem of freedom [9, 1436].

A. Schmidt's research is interesting not only for its conclusions, but also for its methodological approach to the analysis of the time dimension of the phenomenon of freedom. After all, the researcher needs to choose from which moment in a person's life to start the countdown of the starting opportunities for the realization of freedom, on which time periods to measure the fulfillment of the opportunity to realize freedom? What scale of life events can be considered opportunities that acquire the meaning of new starting opportunities? Also important are the questions about the extent to which the state should paternalistically influence a person's intrapersonal choice in the distribution of his freedom in time, and does this not interfere with the dignity of a person regarding the freedom of his choice? A. Schmidt's research is quite applicable for a free democratic civilized society, which has practically un-
limited resources for human self-realization. However, A. Schmidt's research does not cover those large-scale socio-political and environmental factors that can significantly limit human freedom, although the potential for researching these problems has already been established by the author when analyzing the problem of voluntary slavery.

In the event of a global climate catastrophe, the temperature of the planet may rise by several degrees, crop yields will decrease, fresh water will be scarce in many countries of the world, which will lead to the suffering of a huge number of people and the formation of streams of climate refugees. In the military-political sphere, this will provoke destructive wars, including with the use of nuclear weapons, which will destroy modern civilization, significantly reduce the level and quality of life of people on the planet, and drastically limit the space of their freedom.

The only chance to save civilization from the climate catastrophe that can arise from the use of hydrocarbons by mankind is the introduction of renewable energy, which should not only meet the basic energy needs of mankind to maintain a sufficient standard of living (von Weizsaecker E, Wijkman A.) [10], but also be used to clean the planet from environmental pollution accumulated during the 20th and 21st centuries.

The explanatory model of intrapersonal distribution of freedom, proposed by A. Schmidt, is well applicable for countries with a developed democratic tradition and a more or less high level and quality of life. In authoritarian, totalitarian countries and/or countries with a high level of corruption, the level of socio-political freedom is limited, and the conquest of political freedoms by the main strata of the population is on the agenda. The model for evaluating the level of freedom in the time dimension, proposed by A. Schmidt, is relevant for such countries only in the long term and as a motivation for political action.

A. Schmidt approaches the distribution of the resource of freedom by a person in a pragmatic aspect as something that contributes to its self-realization, but he also pays attention to the valuable aspect of
freedom in the sense that freedom also contributes to the development of increasingly perfect social relations.

A non-standard approach to the analysis of the phenomenon of freedom is offered by C. Dierksmeier, considering it in terms of the categories of quantity and quality - as quantitative freedom and qualitative freedom. This is primarily due to the fact that a quantitative approach to freedom inherent in simplistic liberalism dominates in the modern consumer society. To do this, C. Dierksmeier suggests replacing the approach to freedom that distinguishes it into "negative" and "positive" with an approach that divides it into quantitative and qualitative [3, 3].

In the global dimension, uncontrolled economic freedom, encouraged by liberalism, has, according to C. Dierksmeier, not only the positive advantages of increasing social wealth, but also negative ecological and sociocultural consequences - the decline of biological systems, the decline of traditional customs, political orders, and the disappearance of languages. This is due to the fact that we live in both a globalized and global world, in which our interests are connected with the interests of other people and states [3, 5]. These global circumstances outline both the limitations and the vector of the realization of human freedom. These global problems require the existence of appropriate institutions that must work effectively to implement common values. In this regard, according to C. Dierksmeier, freedom must be balanced in three directions: at the micro-level of individual morality, at the meso-level of social conventions and norms, as well as at the level of general law. All three levels – individuals, associations, as well as governments – should be oriented towards the cosmopolitan framework in which they operate [3, 7].

Analyzing the concept of negative and positive freedom, C. Dirksmeyer notes that negative freedom ("to be free from...") is defined as the absence of forced intervention or encroachment on a person's personality and property; this is generally the position of libertarians. However, the element of denial arises only because there is an understanding of freedom as a positive self-sufficient phenomenon, and linguistic denial here is at the same time an expression of the
objective situation of freedom and/or lack of freedom [3, 24]. A person must have previous experience of manifestations and a sense of freedom in order to see that there is one or another situation of unfreedom from which it is necessary to free oneself by avoiding or overcoming it. The negative understanding of freedom is too narrow, and in order to explain the positive understanding corresponding to it in one or another situation, the following are necessary: 1) striving for rationality; 2) purposeful concentration of the will on moral laws and ethical values; 3) collective orientation to moral laws and ethical values; 4) establishing a republican model of participation in the government; 5) establishing certain pedagogical and cultural prerequisites for autonomous decision-making, as well as 6) economic prerequisites for private autonomy [3, 27]. At the same time, dividing the concept of freedom into quantitative and qualitative freedom opens up the opportunity to explore the phenomenon of freedom in an even broader context. Naturalists and neoclassical economists to a greater extent adhere to the concept of quantitative freedom, humanitarianism - qualitative [3, 32]. In general, freedom is a rather contextual concept and should be explored in moral, social, political, legal and economic aspects [3, 33].

If continental European philosophy developed the idea of freedom in a metaphysical dimension, then Anglo-American philosophy from the end of the eighteenth century tried to investigate the problem of freedom empirically. A person, regardless of his moral and religious orientations, evaluated the quantitative measure of his own freedom as a set of opportunities and advantages in private life. The theory of quantitative freedom comes from the model of rational exchange, when we respect the interests of another by limiting our own to the extent that the other will also limit his interests in an equivalent way for our sake; in the absence of an equivalent exchange, individuals will refrain from cooperation [3, 39]. The concept of economic behaviorism and homo economicus, which acts exclusively rationally and selfishly, are based precisely on the idea of quantitative freedom, and persons who in their own assessments and practical actions adhere to the specified concept express themselves, as a rule, skeptically and cynically about the nature of man and society [3, 302].
Overview of metaphysical concepts of freedom C. Dirksmeyer begins the analysis of the problem of freedom in the works of I. Kant. According to C. Dierksmeier, I. Kant proposed the idea of publicity as something that defines itself. In the political imperative based on public self-criticism and the transformation of political freedom, I. Kant is the first to defend reflexive democracy and procedural politics. I. Kant finds out what factors encourage individuals to take an active part in social freedom and achieve success in political freedom. The Kantian idea of autonomy encouraged a diversity of ways of life, which was balanced by procedural constraints. I. Kant thus introduced the concept of extreme relevance of intercultural diversity [3, 283].

According to C. Dierksmeier, the concept of quantitative freedom was developed by F. Hayek, who believed that there should be a maximum of individual freedom and a minimum of statehood. Based on the programmatic ideas of social evolutionism, decentralization, mutually agreed decision-making procedure and private autonomy, he believed that institutions should not be absolutized, but such that they can change and improve. In society, there should be free economic competition of all citizens within the limits determined by the constitution, and the "invisible hand" of the market should harmonize fair mutual relations between them. For F. Hayek, freedom is a principle that has an ethical meaning. For him, freedom is the freedom of the rich agents; the state must create prerequisites for independent economic activity, in which the freedom of some economic agents should not interfere with the freedom of others [3, 288].

J. Rawls, based on his own theory of justice, proposed, according to C. Dierksmeier, the qualitative characteristics of freedom to be introduced by quantitatively calculated utility. He used certain procedural rules that create conditions for a free social contract between citizens, which builds the framework of the political system only on ethically acceptable bases [3, 289]. J. Rawls sought to avoid metaphysics and to base his own theoretical positions on the observed nature of man when the liberal social order was established. According to J. Rawls, negotiation positions between individuals are exclusively utilitarian in nature, and relationships between individuals depend on the approximate sym-
metry of the price-benefit potential between those involved in mutual exchange. He proposes ethical relativism in foreign policy, and dogmatic liberalism in domestic policy [3, 289].

Analysis of the concepts of F. Hayek and J. Rawls, according to C. Dierksmeier, shows that the quantitative approach does not work and constantly slides to qualitative concepts, because liberalism is dogmatic and does not accept criticism. In the end, philosophical liberalism slides into positivist physicalism. The theory of quantitative freedom is not self-sufficient and requires qualitative addition and justification. C. Dirksmeier notes: "Quantitative freedom finds its foundation in qualitative freedom; qualitative freedom reveals its measure in quantitative freedom" [3, 291].

K. Galbraith's concept of economic and political freedom, according to C. Dierksmeier, is a concept of qualitative freedom. K. Galbraith tried to connect economics with social sciences and practical philosophy, focusing on freedom and justice. K. Galbraith believed that citizens can significantly influence social changes, therefore it is necessary to encourage awareness of citizens in the mechanisms of influence on economic processes in order to introduce conceptual tools in the public interest in liberal reforms of their life world. He campaigned for the democratization of the economy by means of reflexive self-critical economic activity. He deprived economics of the remnants of the natural sciences, since the latter are characterized by a hidden normativity [3, 291]. In his opinion, it is necessary to show the values that govern the economy and economists in order to freely determine the economic parameters and institutions that affect our lives. In this sense, how opinions, power and markets are formed under the powerful influence of economic entrepreneurs is very important. In order for freedom not to be reduced exclusively to freedom of commerce, democratization of economic policy is necessary. Everyone's freedom must be taken beyond the economic analysis of utility and costs [3, 291]. F. Laloux in a certain sense developed the ideas of K. Galbraith. Also relying on the philosophical concept of K. Wilber [11], F. Laloux believed that by developing a higher level of moral and ecological consciousness, individ-
uals in advanced production teams can introduce responsible self-management and create more harmonious social relations [7].

The theory of qualitative freedom allows us to distinguish between its single vision and multifaceted manifestations, it can integrate the most diverse concepts of freedom (negative, positive, substantial, emancipatory, republican, procedural, etc.). While the quantitative approach encourages everyone to maximize options, the idea of qualitative freedom offers openness and variety. Qualitative considerations should precede quantitative measurements of individual and social spheres of freedom and give instructions to the latter. Therefore, qualitative freedom realizes and justifies quantitative problems [3, 292].

The incubator of new developments, according to C. Dierksmeier, is civil society, which functions through the cooperation of citizens, the competition of innovations in business or in the search for scientific truth. Politicians in this matter lack the experience and understanding to prudently achieve their goals. Politicians do not know enough what society needs for its competitive development [3, 293].

The logic of qualitative freedom (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, etc.) is more categorical and unconditionally assumes mutual recognition of each other's freedom by citizens. In this sense, the idea of qualitative freedom focuses on asymmetric relations between individuals. We must recognize basic human rights without getting anything in return [3, 42].

Freedom can actually be realized in society if, according to C. Dierksmeier, it is fair freedom for everyone. Human freedom should be realized not only in the guarantees of preserving his life and inviolability of his property, but also in the possibility of self-realization in various spheres of life. The realization of freedom requires a socially active state, the autonomy of each person, a developed civil society and a cultural community that will cultivate the spread of values. At the same time, freedom is inseparable from a person's willingness to take responsibility for the protection and reproduction of the environment, the formation of adequate customs, as well as from whether members of society willingly comply with legal rules or only under the threat of sanctions [3, 311]. In a society, freedom can be rightly distributed if all its
members have equal access to public goods, such as education, health care, culture, transport. If the global society is moving towards a global society in which everyone makes a decent contribution to the decent life of all, then there should not be excessive material stratification, in which there is a separation of the rich and rejection of the poor. At the same time, the social practice should be encouraged, when a person who has equal opportunities with others, is promoted to leadership positions through his own work and should be rewarded. Tyrannical and anarchic conditions mostly deprive citizens of both freedom and equality [3, 312].

In order to realize freedom and equality of opportunities, it is necessary, according to C. Dierksmeier, to adhere to a global ethos that represents the heritage of all human traditions within the limits of a specific multiplicity of cultures, which are in a state of interaction and convergence and form the basis of human self-orientation. The key idea in the global ethos project is that as a result of the convergence of elementary values, people of different backgrounds can develop common ideas and meaningful cooperation through dialogue [3, 323-324]. The goal of developing a common global ethos is not leveling and standardization, but orientation and coordination of people's behavior so that people, according to their own beliefs, in all difficult situations find appropriate solutions to common problems that will arise before them [3, 325].

Thus, C. Dirksmeyer, researching quantitative and qualitative freedom, shows that it is necessary to overcome the pragmatist tendency of the latter and supplement it with qualitative freedom, which is oriented not only on the well-being and self-realization of individuals, but also on absolute values. The latter is a catalyst for the establishment of fair and balanced social relations, which allows us to successfully solve global problems.

A comprehensive approach to the problem of freedom was proposed by D. Frederick, analyzing it in several aspects: metaphysical, moral-ethical, social, scientific-experimental, and the last approach is dominant. Therefore, he begins his analysis by observing natural processes, which also include the adaptive actions of animals and humans. D. Frederik does not use the methodology of science of the 18th centu-
ry, in which the main principle was determinism, but he uses the methodology of science of the 20th and 21st centuries, in which the main principle is indeterminism and fallibilism. The fallibilist approach, developed by K. Popper, claims that it is impossible to definitively substantiate any beliefs, opinions and hypotheses, since there is always the possibility of replacing them with better ones; in other words, absolute certainty in epistemological propositions can never be achieved and all possibilities cannot be ruled out [6, 32].

According to D. Frederick, an individual action and an act of will are one and the same event. An act of the will is an indeterministic act which, being an act, is under the control of the one who acts. Actions are more or less predictable because they are carried out according to the laws of probability [6, 33]. Based on the theory of evolution, it can be assumed that animals also have a certain freedom of will, but they do not have a developed personality, which is inherent in humans, and do not feel responsibility for their actions. In addition, since the deep laws of nature have a probabilistic nature, it can be assumed that the voluntary actions of a person do not violate the laws of nature, but fit into them. A person in his subjective perception believes that his actions are manifestations of his will, and not just adaptive reactions of his organism. However, whether a person's volitional actions in their objective manifestation are the realization of free will is a question from the positions of fallibilism, which D. Frederick adheres to, cannot be decided definitively [6, 39].

D. Frederick distinguishes the understanding of the phenomenon of freedom by man in deductive-theoretical, empirical and practical aspects. In deductive reasoning, our goal is to find out what logically follows from a set of premises. We try to achieve our goal by first guessing a way to achieve the result and then accepting, rejecting, or testing that decision; and if we mean to check this solution, we can choose and propose another solution [6, 100].

In our empirical attempts to understand the world, we aim to improve our theories. If we find a discrepancy between our assumption and the result of observation, then we decide what adjustments to make in our theoretical statement, compare it with the previous one, and make
a choice of a better statement. In reasoning using practical arguments, a person tries to decide what to do. However, given the possibility of error, a person must decide whether to act on pre-existing knowledge of the situation or to test this knowledge. The decision of how to act can be nothing more than a guess [6, 100]. Accordingly, a person is instrumentally rational if he keeps his actual and potential actions open to reasoned criticism and is willing to revise his plans of action if criticism shows that his actual or potential actions are wrong [6, 102].

Separating objective and subjective rationality, D. Frederick notes that from the standpoint of the instrumental principle, a person is rational only when he acts in a way that corresponds to his goal. The objective goals of a person are those inherent to him ontologically in accordance with his own nature; namely, these are her absolute needs. A person's subjective goals are those that he makes with his intentions [6, 104]. Based on the idea of the fallibility of human activity, a person's subjective goals differ from his objective goals and only emphasize them. Actions are objective in the sense of a given goal (whether subjective or objective) if and only if the corresponding action achieves the given goal, regardless of whether the person thought about it or not. An action in the proper sense is subjective to achieve a goal only if one perceives the action in the proper sense to achieve that goal [6, 104].

Animals, according to D. Frederick, can act freely, according to their own nature, which includes physical characteristics, abilities, inclinations and needs. An animal adapts well when, thanks to its abilities and inclinations, it can satisfy its needs by being active in its own environment. An animal has a good life to the extent that its needs are satisfied. Social animals have a social structure within which they have different roles according to which they contribute to the life of the group and the reproduction of its genotype. Groups of animals have a certain culture by which they learn the modes of behavior which are prevalent in the group and which are transmitted by imitation from older to younger members [6, 140-141]. Some, though not all, animals are persons. A person has the capacity for critical rationality, which means that he can imagine alternatives to given proposals, and he can use arguments to criticize the proposals before him, to compare better or
worse ones. It thus has a developed language with descriptive and argumentative functions. A person also has an idea about the action that he can implement [6, 141].

According to D. Frederick, people are the only animals that know who are persons. Each person is born into a community with an institutional structure of greater or lesser complexity and with common knowledge and traditions that they share. His hypotheses about his nature derive primarily from the knowledge and customs he receives from his community, but his critical rationality allows him to criticize these hypotheses and act in an alternative way. An open society offers people more opportunities for greater freedom of choice between them; but it also gives a person the opportunity to define a new role for himself and the opportunity to make a living in accordance with it. In an open society, man not only has the ability to consider various theories about his nature and the best ways to find self-fulfillment; he also has the ability to test the most plausible of these theories in order to live up to them; taking precautions to reduce risks and costs where reasonable [6, 141].

The moral aspect of freedom is important in D. Frederick's concept of freedom. In his opinion, moral problems of relations between people are connected, among other things, with the issue of resource distribution between them. According to D. Frederick, a person lives a full life to the extent that he satisfies his needs, and this requires the use of resources. Resources consumed by one person are not available to others. A person should consume only those resources to which he is entitled. Man's moral duty is to limit the resources he spends on lifestyle experimentation for self-fulfillment. This is the objective basis of morality.

Objective moral rules give a person freedom for self-discovery. Therefore, objective moral rules are indirectly based on the absolute needs of people. They do not require a person to define and satisfy the absolute needs of others. These are such rules that the more people act in accordance with them, the greater the opportunities for people in general to discover and satisfy absolute needs for themselves [6, 186].
In general, moral theories set limits, taking into account which people can still freely realize themselves.

An important factor in a person's realization of freedom is such an important institution as the state, which ensures compliance with social norms, and without the state there would be no developed civil society. From the Modern era, according to D. North, the state relies less and less on violence and is interested in the introduction of democracy and political freedom [8]; such a state and civil society, according to D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, begin to compete for which of them will create the best conditions for the competitive free development of the economy [7].

According to D. Frederick, although the state is formed in the collective activity of individuals, it is separated from them. Between the state and citizens there are mutual obligations, in particular, not to surrender to voluntary slavery and to provide a fair share of the resources necessary for the state to fulfill its obligations, to follow fair state schemes for the transformation of non-owned or state resources into private property [6, 234-235]. The state is an abstract entity formed by relations, represented by persons who are officials of the state, contributing to the fulfillment of its obligations. The main duty of the state, according to D. Frederick, is to ensure people's freedom to experiment with different lifestyles to achieve self-realization, therefore every state has an obligation to its subjects to be a liberal state. A fundamental duty of the liberal state is freedom of speech, because self-actualization depends on self-knowledge, which in turn depends on the freedom to examine and criticize even their inherited narratives that may be part of a person's identity. But the state must also ensure and ban those statements that have a high probability of causing an immediate violation of the legal rights of individuals [6, 235-236].

In a civilized society, it is assumed by default that one should experiment in order to discover what satisfies him, but in doing so he must avoid violating moral rules so that others also have the freedom to experiment to discover what satisfies them. The duty of the state is to ensure the maximum freedom of individuals by observing a set of moral rules set forth in the best moral theories [6, 237].
D. Frederik examines the important role of the state in maintaining the conditions that ensure the freedom of human self-realization and the fair distribution of relevant resources among citizens. At the same time, since the beginning of 2022, humanity has faced the problem of the need to consolidate civilized states in connection with the aggression of totalitarianism against democracy and freedom.

Also, M. Farina and A. M. Lavazza consider the duties of the state in relation to the rights of citizens. The state's concern for the protection of citizens from epidemics, in particular the Covid-19 pandemic, should not, in their opinion, lead to a violation of the individual's right to privacy. Thus, in the use of digital technologies to monitor the spread of Covid-19, there is a threat of violation of privacy of a person's private life, control over his contacts and establishment of surveillance, which limits his freedom [4, 3]. Biopolitics as control exercised over people's bodies through the categories of science and medicine cannot be excessive and violate inalienable human rights and freedoms. After all, not all epidemic risks are the same and so threatening that they can be exchanged for basic values. According to M. Farina and A. M. Lavazza: “... The task of a philosophical and ethical reflection is then to identify a correct balance between the degree of immunity that is thought to be necessary and the respective reduction of other inalienable values and rights. Biopolitical decisions that put immunity first as a synonym of security run into the risk of sacrificing privacy and basic freedoms, by using technical tools that promise highly effective control over the spread of the virus” [4, 3]. Control over a person's contacts violates his basic rights, constrains his actions, which affects his freedom of activity and reduces his creative potential. This ultimately affects the competitiveness of the society's economy as a whole. Therefore, in society, it is necessary to establish appropriate supervisory bodies under government control, which will monitor the balance between the specified risks and establish sanctions for uncontrolled processing of personal data [4, 3]. In order to solve this problem, according to M. Farina and A. M. Lavazza, the biopolitics of the state regarding the immunity of the population should be proportional to the existing danger. In addi-
tion, the state must monitor software vulnerabilities and implement a system of checks and balances to prevent discovered abuses [4, 4].

Thus, in the conditions of radical changes in the modern world, new interpretations of the phenomenon of freedom, which were considered insignificant earlier, come to the fore. Man begins to understand freedom in connection with natural, material, ecological, social, cultural, psychological and other resources that are at his disposal and that should be fairly distributed in the global society. For this, the understanding of freedom as "freedom from" and "freedom for" should be supplemented by the distinction between quantitative and qualitative freedom in order to reflexively regulate its implementation. In addition, the distribution of the resource of freedom for the self-realization of a person must be planned in the time of his life perspective in order to achieve the maximum self-realization of a person in the conditions of limited material and environmental resources and the imperative of fair distribution of these resources with other persons.

So, the pragmatist understanding of freedom does not contradict the fact that it should also be valuable, because for the realization of values, which includes the need to provide human life with material resources that cannot be neglected. However, in addition to the values of human survival, there are equally important values of development and global ecological well-being of mankind. In this sense, higher transcendental values promote more harmonious and productive social relations and are also pragmatic.

**Originality.** A pragmatic approach to the understanding of human freedom is an important tool for its adaptation to nature and society, however, a person adapts better to the natural and social environment in free competitive creativity and solidary co-creation with other individuals. A creative value approach to freedom means the free self-realization of a person on the basis of universal values at the expense of less and less use of non-renewable natural resources and greater use of intellectual and spiritual resources. The conceptual base and practical ability of the pragmatist approach is developed by expanding it at the expense of transcendental values, including the values of freedom. In times of crises and civilizational transformations, society can
avoid wars, severe social upheavals, and restrictions on freedom if, listening to the humanitarian elite, it sufficiently understands the deep laws of human and social development, and applies them in its own life practice.

Conclusions. As a result of the aggravation of crisis phenomena in the modern world, including large-scale military confrontations, as well as the growing threat of climate catastrophe, the focus of philosophical research is the problem of the correlation of pragmatist and value approaches to the problem of freedom. The pragmatist approach here can be expressed as a problem of human distribution of the resource of freedom in time (A. Schmidt), as a problem of quantitative freedom (C. Dierksmeyer), or one or another way of maintaining the distribution of the resource of freedom among citizens by the state (D. Frederick). If the realization of these values in the life of a person and society does not take place with the participation of the humanitarian elite of society through enlightenment and the introduction of progressive social practices, then mankind will acquire relevant knowledge in the conditions of destructive wars and environmental disasters.

LITERATURE


REFERENCES


Прагматистське та ціннісне розуміння свободи у кризову добу

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Анотація
Мета статті полягає у тому, щоб показати, що при аналізі еволюційних змін у суспільстві прагматистський підхід до проблеми свободи в цілому не суперечить ціннісному, оскільки важливою цінністю є підтримання життєвості й вільного розвитку людини й суспільства. Проте, у ситуації кардинальної трансформації глобального соціуму, кліматичних загроз й військово-політичних протистоянь свободи й демократії, з одного боку, та тоталітаризму й авторитаризму, – з іншого, на перше місце виходять вищі трансцендентні цінності, які також мають прагматичну мету виживання людської цивілізації. Прагматизм у теоретичній площині вважає важливим визнання критерієм істини її повторюваність та підтверджуваність (Р. Фербер) [5. 113], а у практичній – можливість реалізації ідей людини на практиці. Зважаючи на це, при розгляді протистояння прагматистських й ціннісних аспектів при аналізі проблеми свободи можливо декілька підходів. По-перше, визнати, що вузький прагматизм керується егоїстичними цінностями у процесі розподілення ресурсу свободи, і тим самим руйнує продуктивну соціальну взаємодію й врешті-решт виявляється «некорисним». По-друге, визнати, що певні, навіть трансцендентні, цінності, найважливішою із яких є свобода, є практично корисними й такими, що не суперечать ідеї прагматизму. Тому вони можуть бути включені у саму
прагматистську категоріальну систему як орієнтир до дій. Разом із тим, вищі трансцендентні цінності є невидимими й устремління втілити їх у повній мірі може бути задоволене лише у майбутньому. Прагматистський підхід до розуміння свободи людини є важливим інструментом її адаптації до природи й суспільства, проте людина краще адаптується до природного й соціального середовища у вільній конкурентній творчості й солідарній співтворчості з іншими особами. Творчий ціннісний підхід до свободи означає вільну самореалізацію людини на основі загальнопродуктивних цінностей за раціоновник все меншого використання невідновлювального природних ресурсів та більшого використання інтелектуально-духовних ресурсів. Концептуальна база й практичний хіст прагматистського підходу розвивається шляхом його розширення за раціоновник трансцендентний цінності, що включають і цінності свободи. У часи криз та цивілізаційних трансформацій суспільство може уникаюти війн, жорстких соціальних потрясення та обмежень свободи, якщо, прислухаючись до гуманітарної еліти, буде у достатній мірі розуміти глибинні закономірності розвитку людини й суспільства, і застосовуватиме їх у власній життєвій практиці. Також слід додати, що прагматистський критерій істини демонструє міру втілення практичних ідей. Внаслідок загострення у сучасному світі кризових явищ, у тому числі й масштабних військових протистоянь, а також зростання загрози катастрофічної катастрофи, центром уваги філософського дослідження стає проблема співвідношення прагматистського й ціннісного підходів до проблеми свободи. Прагматистський підхід тут може набувати вираження як проблема розподілення людиною ресурсу свободи у часі (А. Шмідт), як проблема кількісної свободи (К. Дірксе), або того чи іншого способу підтримання з боку держави розподілення ресурсу свободи між громадянами (Д. Фредерік). Суперечність між прагматистським і ціннісним підходом допускає шляхом включення у прагматистський категоріальний апарат процедур оцінювання та практичних схем діяльності людства на основі вищих трансцендентних цінностей. Разом із тим, прагматичний критерій істинності дозволяє подолати популізм. Якщо реалізація цих цінностей у життєвій практиці людини й суспільства не відбувається, то людство буде засвоювати відповідні знання в умовах руйнівних війн та екологічних катастроф.