Peter Lombard’s *Book of Sentences* (or simply the *Sentences*) played a crucial role in the formation of the scholastic theological and philosophical discourse of the Later Middle Ages (the 13th–16th centuries). Recent rediscovery of the «Sentences Tradition» which implied the distribution of and the commenting on the *Sentences* in the medieval universities has testified to the importance and multifacetedness of this custom in the times of Bonaventure, Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Ockham, and other luminaries of the age [2; 6; 21; 22]. The research led by M.Colish, P.Rosemann, and G.R. Evans has contributed a lot to our knowledge of Peter Lombard’s thought and his *opus magnum*’s place in the development of medieval scholastic theologies [2; 4; 1; 3; 6; 23; 26; 19; 20]. Most recently, his heritage has been studied from the point of view of mystical theology – via the notion of the «beatific enjoyment» – by S.Kitanov [8], through the lens of correlation between the Canon Law and theology by A.Larson [10; 9], in relation to the twelfth-century ecclesial politics and Christological controversy by C.Monagle [12; 11], and in connection with such topics as theological methodology or sacramental theology by P.Rosemann [25; 24]. Yet, some topics – especially those relating to philosophical theology and, in particular, theology proper – which Lombard touched upon and discussed in his *Sentences* are still to be analyzed.

Colish in her magisterial work provided an overview of Master Peter’s doctrine of God’s will [2, vol. 1, 300–302] but, still, a more detailed and nuanced exposition is wanting. Therefore, having talked about the Lombardian doctrine of God’s knowledge elsewhere [29; 30],

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in this article I will concentrate on the issue of divine will as understood by the *Magister sententiarum*. The textual basis for such an investigation is to be found in Distinctions 45 and 46 of the *Sentences* – it is here that the will of God is introduced, explicated, and juxtaposed with the will of man [16; 17].

**DISTINCTION 45: INTRODUCING THE DIVINE WILL**

Having disclosed his understanding of God’s knowledge and potency in distinctions 35–44, Peter Lombard comes to a treatment of the divine will as such. The distinction 45 becomes a platform on which he presents many nuances of this concept: here he speaks of the nature of God’s will as God’s characteristic and of God’s willing as an act, analyzes its linguo-logical and metaphysical aspects, and draws a distinction between the will and its signs. Master Peter notes, that «much discretion is to be exercised in the …cognition of the divine will» (*Magna enim est adhibenda discretio in cognitione divinae voluntatis*) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.7, no. 3, 1:312; 15 Sent. 1, 1, 246] and sets out for a theology of the will.

Firstly, he notes that the will of the willingness of God (*voluntas sive volens*) is his essential feature or, more precisely, his nature itself (*divina usia*) – due to the principal simplicity of God. For God to be (*esse*) means to know and to will (*velle*). Therefore, the divine act of willing should not be thought of as an external deed of God or a kind of motion in God (*non affectus vel motus est*). It is rather an aspect or mode of his essence, something seen "according to the essence» (*secundum essentiam dicitur*). Put briefly, it is the *divine essence qua willing* (*divina usia qua volens est*) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap. 1, 1:306; 15, 1:241], and hear, rather remarkably, «volens» serves as a participle modifying a noun – it does not mean «the willer» in the sense of the suppositum or agent and, instead, stands for «willing».

But when one speaks of God as knowing or God as willing, a linguistic-logical and, by extension, a theological problem arises. If God is his will(ing), then what God wills is somehow God. At least, this is a possible implication of the identification of God with his willing and knowing [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.2, no. 1-2, 1:307; 15, 1:241]. But
Peter Lombard denies that and offers an important distinction that serves as his solution of this problem.

He says that there are two types of predications about God (quid de Deo praedicetur): one is taken to denote the divine essence «simply and absolutely» (simpliciter et absolute), whereas the other speaks of it «not simply and absolutely» (non simpliciter et absolute), that is, relatively, in connection with something else [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap. 3, Sententiae I, 1:307; 15, Sentences 1, 1:242]. It is one thing to say «God knows» and «God wills» (Deus scit vel Deus vult) and the other – to add an object to this phrase and state «God knows everything» or «God wills something» (Deus scit omnia vel vult aliquid).

In the first case, God is both the subject and the scope of the proposition – it is he who wills, it is he who knows. This expression is to be understood secundum essentiam and, hence, can be paraphrased, as «God is God as knowing» or «God is God as willing», for here «the divine essence is predicated and pronounced to be God» (essentia divina praedicatur et Deus esse enuntiatur) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap. 3, Sententiae I, 1:307; 15, Sentences 1, 1:241–242]. And this is the simple and absolute predication about the divine essence. Hence, technically,

\[1 \quad G^K \supset (G \land K)\]

and

\[1* \quad G^W \supset (G \land W)\]

In the second case, «God knows» or «God wills» used relatively, and so the proposition has both subject(s) and object(s) and speaks of God who does something to, or with, or over, a certain object. It looks like, «God knows this thing» or «God wills that thing to happen». Formally, it would be

\[2 \quad G^K \supset G^Kp\]

or

\[2* \quad G^W \supset G^Wp\]

But then the focus of the proposition shifts from God’s essence per se to the relation between God and a thing known or willed – in fact, between two or more different essences. Consequently, it can no more be equated with predication secundum essentiam and therefore it excludes any possibility of identification of the objects of God’s

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cognition or volition with God’s own nature. In other words, «God cannot be said to be all things which he wills [or knows]» (non tamen potest dici Deus esse omnia quae vult [vel scit]) [Ibid. Cf. Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.2, no. 1, 3]. Although Lombardus does not speak literally of transitive or intransitive interpretation of verbs’ function or proposition’s meaning, it will be a plausible explication of his words. His «simple and absolute» and «not simple» but relative types of predications should be equated with the modern grammatical concept of intransitive and transitive verbs, respectively. Linguistically and theologically speaking, statements as «God knows» and «God wills» can be understood in two ways: either intransitively whereby «God» is a subject of the proposition and «knows/wills» is a predicate, or transitively whereby «God» is a subject, «knows/wills» a verbal predicate, and there is an additional element signifying the object or addressee of the predicate’s operation. This is how we may translate the Lombardian notion to the contemporary parlance.

This distinction in terminology implies the ad intra and ad extra «features» of God and highlights his total sovereignty and unique independence. He is the all-knowing and all-willing God anyway, even if there is no creation. His essence is perfect and infinitely powerful. But, granted that there is the (or a) God-made world, God is still permanently distinct from what he makes, knows and wills [Cf. 2, vol. 1, 300–301]. The world always remains the object of God’s activity, which should – and could – never pretend to be of God-like status. Even the theo-logical propositional principles deny this option.

But Peter Lombard does not stop at this denial of the world’s hypothetical independence of God – he firmly emphasizes God’s absolute freedom of the will by stating that God’s will has no other cause for its decisions. It means that «this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are, or were, or will be made; and it is preceded by no cause because it is eternal. And so no cause for it is to be sought» (Haec itaque summe bona voluntas causa est omnium quae naturaliter fiunt vel facta sive future sunt, quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est. Ideoque causa ipsius quaerenda non est) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.4, no. 1, , 1:308; 15, 1:242].
The Master of Sentences takes a clearly Augustinian – and also Anselmian – line of reasoning. If God’s willing has any cause for its operation and decision-making process, then there is something ontically greater than, and logically prior to, it. But that is theologically impossible. Furthermore, the authority of the doctor gratiae utterly denies such a possibility. God wills simply because he wills so (quia voluit). Therefore the divine will has no cause whatsoever [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.4, no. 2-3, Sententiae I, 1:308–309; 15, Sentences 1, 1:242–243]. So Lombard removes the created things and any possible uncreated power from his list of candidates for the position of the ultimate cause of God’s will. This leaves open whether there are internal causes for God’s will (like his intellect). But Lombard is silent at this point, and the supposed relations and logical order between God’s scientia, potentia, and voluntas remains unrevealed. Instead, Master Peter tries to shed some light on the mystery of biblical expressions referring – or supposed to be referring – to the will of God (Quibus modis in Scriptura accipitur Dei voluntas). The Bible frequently speaks of God’s will in the plural (voluntates) or by means of synonyms or figures of speech (variis modis loqui, secundum figuram), which make allusions to a sort of diversity or complexity within the will of God (Dei voluntas diversa) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.5, no. 1; cap.6, no. 1, Sententiae I, 1:309, 310; 15, Sentences 1, 1:243, 244].

But Lombard denies any multiplicity of wills in God and asserts it to be one, simple and indivisible: «it is not God’s will which is different, but the expressions concerning it are different» (non est Dei voluntas diversa, sed locutio diversa est de voluntate) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.5, no. 1, Sententiae I, 1:309; 15, Sentences 1, 1:243]. But he agrees that there is a perfect synonymical expression that is often used to denote the voluntas Dei and which grasps its nature very well. The expression he means is «the good pleasure or disposition of God» (beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio). For Master Peter, it is a full synonym of the divine will [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.2, no. 2, Sententiae I, 1:309; 15, Sentences 1, 1:242–243]. Hence it becomes undoubtedly clear now, that when Lombard was writing about God’s foreknowledge as sometimes
functioning in conjunction with God’s good pleasure and disposition in distinctions 35-39, he, in fact, meant God’s will [30, 26–28].

However, it is the only full synonym of the notion of «will.» The other biblical and extrabiblical terms – namely, the five nouns: precept (praeceptio), prohibition (prohibitio), permission (permissio), counsel (consilium), and operation (operatio) – are figures of speech only. They can be called «divine wills» but do not denote the will of God as such. Rather, they signify «signs of the divine will» (signa divinae voluntatis), for God’s commandments, advice, admonitions, and other revelatory acts, which address the human audience, express what God wants but are not God’s will essentially. These precepts and prohibitions are given in time and space for people who live in time and space, so that they might be able to act in accordance with them hic et nunc. This is their proper function [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap. 6-7, Sententiae I, 1:310–312; 15, Sentences 1, 1:244–246]. In Peter’s own words, «five things are set out above which are called ‘the will of God' according to a figure of speech, because they are signs of the divine will, which is one and immutable, namely God’s good pleasure. And so let the reader diligently distinguish, where Scripture makes mention of the will of God, according to what sense it ought to be taken, namely whether for God’s good pleasure or for some sign of it. … his good pleasure is eternal, while a sign of his good pleasure is not» [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.7, no. 3, Sententiae I, 1:311–312; 15, Sentences 1, 1:246].

Thus, the will of God is his disposition and his good pleasure, but is distinct from its own expressions of signs, which are meant by the five important and often used biblical words (precept, prohibition, permission, operation, and counsel), collectively named «the wills of God». These five words point out to the multiple significata, which are the temporary and outward expressions and «signs» of their respective unitary significatum – God’s will as such [Cf. 2, 1:301]. Additionally, this differentiation between the signs and the true signified allows for a place for the creaturely freedom vis-à-vis that of the Trinity: no man can fight or thwart the will of God, that is, his willing essence, but it is possible for men to resist and even break the signs of this will. So, as G. Silano notes, it is here «in this space between God’s unchanging will
and its variable signs that God allows human freedom to operate,» [15, xlvii] although it is not the only «metaphysical locale» for the human freedom’s implementation.

This complex linguistic-metaphysical construction helps Lombard keep the uniqueness and numerical unity of the divine will and adequately interpret the plural form of the word «will» in the Bible as well as a set of other similar terms. So, it is useful on both semantic and theological levels, which Master Peter does not separate.

**DISTINCTION 46: CONTRASTING THE WILL OF GOD AND THE WILL OF MAN**

Although God’s will is «the most highly good cause of all things that naturally are» (summe bona causa est omnium quae naturaliter sunt) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 45, cap.4, no. 1, Sententiae I, 1:308; 15, Sentences 1, 1:242], it is not yet clear how it cooperates or coexists with the will of rational creatures. This is why Master Peter decides to make an effort to settle this serious issue.

He cites several passages from the Bible, which speak of the all-encompassing nature of the divine will’s operative power (Ps. 113, 11) and irresistibility (Rom. 9, 19), supplementing them with quotes from Augustine’s *Enchiridion*. But he does not omit the texts, which defend the opposite thesis that the divine will does not always act efficaciously and, thus, is resistible (Matt. 23, 37; 1 Tim. 2, 4). In fact, Lombard directly admits that there are authoritative statements that seem to contradict each other, but believes that it is an illusory impression.

He denies that «the Will of God, which He Himself is, can be cancelled in nothing» (voluntas Dei, quae ipse est, in nullo cassari potest) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap. 1, Sententiae I, 1:312–313; 14, Sentences I, 1:814], but does not really clarify the details of its correlation to the will of men. Yet, he provides a fascinating interpretation of two of the mentioned passages.

Firstly, Peter turns his attention to Matt. 23, 37, which reads: «How often did I will to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks, and you did not will it.» No resistibility or imperfection on the God’s part is implied here. Rather, the verse’s meaning is to be
explained by following the intuitions of Augustine and the commentators of the *Glossa ordinaria*. The former is encapsulated in this point: «she [i.e. Jerusalem] did not will that her children be gathered by him, but despite her refusal, he gathered as many of her children as he willed: because *in heaven and on earth... he did whatever he willed*» (illa quidem filios suos ab ipso colligi noluit; qua tamen nolente, filios eius collegit ipse omnes quos voluit: quia in caelo et in terra... he did whatever he willed) ([16, *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap.2, no. 1, *Sententiae I*, 1:313; 15, *Sentences I*, 1:247]. The latter sounds like this: «*How often did I will to gather your children, and you did not will it*, that is, as often as I gathered them, I did so by my always efficacious will and against your will» (Quo ties volui congregare filios iuos, et noluisti, id est quotquot congregavi voluntate mea semper efficaci, te nolente feci) ([16, *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap.2, no. 1, *Sententiae I*, 1:313; 15, *Sentences I*, 1:247]. It is the last quotation that Lombard identifies with the sense (*sensus*) of the verse Mat. 23, 37 ([16, *Sent.* 1, dist. 46, cap.2, no. 1, *Sententiae I*, 1:313; 15, *Sentences I*, 1:247]. Thus, Augustine provides the foundation and the *Glossa* the formulation of his *solutio*. In spite of God’s desire to gather the Israelites under his rule (*volui congregare*), they did not wish it (*noluit, nolente, noluisti*); but in spite of their refusal, God’s efficacious will has managed to gather (*feci, congregavi*) those select people he willed to gather (*collegit ipse omnes quos voluit*). Thus, there is no direct conflict between the divine and human wills – there is some tension but it is not a problem for God. He is able to «overcome» or «vanquish» any creature’s will, but instead, he efficiently acts upon it only if – and when – he wishes. His cooperation or negation of cooperation with the human will is ruled only by his free decision.

It does not look like a real exegesis of the text, but the Lombardian reading of this biblical passage is curious. Firstly, he changes the subject of the Matthean saying and instead of God’s complex relationship with Jerusalem and his covenant people inserts this verse into the discussion over the mechanism of interaction of human and divine wills. Secondly, it seems Lombard does not distinguish
between will as intention and will as execution. It is well-known that in
the classic Latin the meaning of *velle* was primarily «to want,» «wish,»
«being inclined to,» but the Christian theology of the Middle Ages
added to this the strong emphasis on *velle* as willing, taking decisions,
executing or using the power to will [See 7; 13; 5; 18; 32; 31], so that,
for instance, Anselm differentiated between these two meanings of the
term and used both [28]. In the cited passage, however, Peter Lombard
swings the pendulum to the extreme: he analyzes the interaction
between the divine and the human will as implying only one aspect: that
of actively willing, using the ability to will, its execution.

This reading of one biblical text is supplemented by the similar
reading of another passage. The Master of Sentences offers his «creative
exegesis,»» bordering on eisegesis, of 1 Tim. 2, 4, where it is written:
«He wills all men to be saved.» The prima facie meaning seems to entail
the conclusion about only partial fulfillment of God’s desires and
intentions. But this thought is impious, and it is not what the text says
according to the Lombard’s view. He asserts that it means the following:
«no man is saved except whom he wills to be saved: not that there is no
man whom he does not will to be saved, but that there is none who is
saved except whom he wills to be saved» (*nullum hominem fieri salvum,
nisi quem fieri ipse voluerit: non quod nullus sit hominum, nisi quem
salvum fieri velit; sed quod nullus fiat salvus, nisi quem velit salvari*
*Sentences I*, 1:248]. Hence, «He wills all men to be saved» is turned
into «He wills all men who are to be saved (according to his divine
counsel and mercy) to be saved,» or, alternatively, «None is saved,
unless she is willed by God.»

Here Lombard simply implements the rules of conversion from
the square of oppositions: the sentence «He wills all men to be saved» is
converted into a universal affirmative statement *A*: «All men, who are to
be saved, are willed by God,» where «all men, who are to be saved» is
the subject and «willed by God» the predicate. The quantifier «all» is
traditionally put before the subject. Hence, his somewhat altered positive
version of the biblical dictum.
But then Peter takes this affirmation and obverts it into a universal negative statement \( E \): «No man is to be saved without being willed by God.» And this is the second part of his explanation presented above. Hence, the manipulation with the Bible’s verse turns into a clear and unambiguous statement about God’s exclusively good intentions concerning men and inadequacy of the interpretation, which argues that the text has to do with some sort of inefficiency of God’s will. By doing this Lombard shows good acquaintance with dialectical rules but also makes a problematic theological gesture. He limits God’s desire to pardon Israel and save all people to the actual willing to save those who are to be saved. Hence, the doctrine of the will is reduced and confined to one of its two aspects. Lombard defends the efficiency of God’s will as actual willing at a price of removing the notion of will as simply desiring or intending from theology proper. This is how it is revealed in his own words: «many have strayed from the truth, saying that God wills many things to be done which are not done. But that text [1 Tim. 2, 4] is not to be understood to have been spoken in that sense as if God had willed some to be saved and they are not saved» (\textit{multi a veritate deviarunt, dicentes Deum multa velle fieri, quae non fiunt, sed non est intelligendum ea ratione illud esse dictum, quasi Deus voluerit aliquos salvari, et non salventur}) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap.2, no. 3, Sententiae I, 1:313; 15, Sentences 1, 1:247].

In other words, it is right to suggest that here Lombard implies the idea of the irresistible divine will’s operation on humans, although these sections of the distinction 46 refer to soteriological teachings only. The biblical passages cited and their interpretation speak of God’s salvific intentions. Yet, it does not stop Lombard from extrapolating and making conclusions about God’s efficacious will in general. But it is not the end of the discussion.

The problem of the interaction between the will of God and wills of men is connected with the problem of evil (in this world at least). So, another question has to be raised: whether evil things are done by God’s will or against his will» (\textit{Utrum mala Dei voluntate fiant, an eo nolente}) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap.3, no. 1, Sententiae I, 1:314; 15, Sentences 1, 1:248]. Since theodicy falls out of the scope of my research I will only
mention Lombard’s solutions and comments that pertain to the nature or operation of God’s will.

Master Peter starts his reasoning on the issue and comes to a first conclusion, namely, that nothing can happen without some kind of involvement of God’s will, for it is the cause of all naturally existing things. But being perfectly good, God cannot by nature will anything evil. Also, there is a freedom which he to a certain extent granted to the world, and this is a generic good plan (or some good purposes) for the world that God always has in mind [See 16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap.3, no. 2–10, Sententiae I, 1:313–316; 15, Sentences 1, 1:248–250]. Therefore here is the best solution for such a conundrum: «evil things are not done with God willing or unwilling, but with him not willing, because it is not subject to God’s will that an evil be done or not done, but that he allows it to be done, because it is good to allow evil things to be done» (Non ergo Deo volente vel nolente, sed non volente fiunt mala, quia non subest Dei voluntati ut malum fiat vel non fiat, sed ut fieri sinat, quia bonum est sinere mala fieri) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap.3, no. 11, Sententiae I, 1:316; 15, Sentences 1, 1:250]. It must be true for otherwise God would not have allowed for any evil.

Thus, God’s neutral not-willing, that is, «not-willing-but-allowing», gives some room for the creatures’ freedom in general and evil things in particular. This not-willing is identical to God’s permitting voluntary activity, for his inactivity and neutrality are deliberately chosen courses of action. It is not that he is actively involved in the emergence of bad things, nor is he unable to do something about it. It is simply because he chose not to will anything particular in this case – in other words, he willed to permit it. Moreover, as Lombard puts it, God allowed for the existence of evil things because he saw something good in it. What exactly?

The Master admits that such a statement is theologically problematic and explains what he – citing Augustine – means by «It is good for evil things to be done.» God permits it because he is able and willing to «draw good things out of the evils which are done» (quia ex malis quae fiunt Deus bona elicit) [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap.4, no. 1, Sententiae I, 1:317; 15, Sentences 1, 1:250–251]. God directs evil
courses of events to some better ends and specifically is engaged in spiritual pedagogy, for by means of some evils (or through them) he teaches, exhorts, purifies, and perfects people – primarily the elect, the saints [16, Sent. 1, dist. 46, cap. 4-7, Sententiae I, 1:318–321; 15, Sentences I, 1:251–255]. Hence, even when the Lord permits an evil event to happen, he still has something good in mind, although he never has evil in mind. For his purposes, which he sets by his knowledge and will are always good par excellence.

**CONCLUSION: TOWARDS THE LOMBARDIAN THEOLOGY OF THE DIVINE WILL**

After this overview of Peter Lombard’s explication of what God’s will is and how it functions, let me summarize the discoveries so far.

The doctrine of *voluntas divina* has to be put into the «Trinitarian essentialist» model, according to which the Triunity of God means that all three Persons of the Godhead share one simple essence. This essence has no parts, and therefore such things as knowledge, wisdom, or will are actually one and the same thing in God: they are one essence. Therefore God’s will is first of all God himself *as* willing. Any theological proposition which uses the verb «to will» intransitively is a statement of God’s essence qua willing.

Yet, God’s nature is differently manifested in his outward actions which allow a theologian to speak of some distinct and distinguishable properties or aspects of this nature as it relates to what is outside the Godhead. Therefore a theological proposition which uses the verb «to will» transitively and adds an object of willing means a statement of the divine will as an outward act. In this case, God’s will should not be identified with God’s essence nor the objects or outcomes of this willing.

If one is to provide a definition of the divine will as it is envisaged by famous Master Peter, this is what has to be concluded. God’s will (*divina voluntas, divina usia qua volens, velle, Dei voluntas rationabilis, justa voluntas sua*) is the divine ability to reasonably will and decide to act in a certain way. It is also called «the good pleasure or disposition of God» (*beneplacitum Dei sive dispositio*). Whatever God does, he does
by it (qua) and in accordance with it (secundum eandem rationem), but never against it (contra quam) or without it (praeter eam). Hence, it is the only divine decision-making ability, and it has one, simple and indivisible nature. The will itself is simply willing – velle. In the analyzed chapters of the Sentences, Peter Lombard almost exclusively speaks of the divine will in one sense – that of execution of the will, the active willing – only once or twice alluding to the dimension of desire or intention.

He also stresses the totally free nature of God’s will, which is said to be preceded by no cause (summe bona voluntas causa est omnium... quae nulla praeventa est causa, quia aeterna est). That is, God wills simply because he wills so (quia voluit). But he admits that God’s will is always in accord with God’s essence, and it cannot be otherwise. Yet, the internal divine mechanism of this decision-making process remains unexamined in the First Book of Sentences.

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Tkachenko R. Peter Lombard’s on God’s Will: Sententiae, Book I, Distinctions 45-46.

The global Peter Lombard research continues, but the Master of the Sentences’ theology proper is still to be analyzed in detail. In particular, a more thorough exposition of the distinctions 45-48 of his Book of Sentences, which deal with the notion of God’s will and its relation to the human free will, has for some while remained a desideratum. The given article partly fills this lacuna and elucidates on the doctrine of the divine will as presented by the Lombard.

In particular, it is shown that for him there exist two ways of speaking about God’s will: «simply and absolutely» and «not simply and absolutely» which may be identified with intransitive and transitive use of the verb «to will,» respectively. The will is primarily understood in terms of execution of one’s will (active willing) but its relation to one’s desires and inclinations (wanting) are downplayed or altogether omitted from the Lombardian doctrine of God. The divine will is by definition free and efficient but Lombard highlights that there is place for human free will, too. His explanation of the
relationship between the divine and the human wills seems somewhat uncon-?incing but the unfolding of his theory on the basis of a few biblical texts should be acknowledged a peculiar theological exercise.

Key words: Peter Lombard, Book of Sentences, medieval scholasticism, God’s will, free will.


Незважаючи на продовження досліджень Петра Ломбардського, проте досі залишається необхідним детальний аналіз саме теології Магістра сentionцій. Зокрема, більш ретельне розкриття дистинкцій 45–48 у його «Книзи сsentenцій», що стосуються поняття Божої волі та її відношення до вільної волі людини, протягом певного часу залишалося desideratum. Запропонована стаття частково заповнює цю лакуну і висвітлює вчення про Божественну волю, як її представляв Ломбардець.

Зокрема показано, що для нього існують два способи говорити про Божу волю: «просто та абсолютно» та «не просто й абсолютно», які можуть бути ототожнені з неперехідним і перехідним використанням дієслова «бажати», відповідно. Згідно доктрини Ломбардця про Бога, воля, передусім, розуміється з точки зору виконання Його волі (активне бажання), а її відношення до бажань і нахилів (прагнення) зменшується або ж загалом виключається. Божественна воля, за визначенням, вільна й ефективна, але Ломбардець підкреслює, що також є місце і для вільної волі людини. Його пояснення відношення між божественною та людською волями видається децю непереконливим, але розкриття його теорії на основі декількох біблійних текстів може бути визнане окремим богословським вченням.

Ключові слова: Петро Ломбардський, «Книга сsentenцій», середньовічна схоластика, Божа воля, вільна воля.